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We present a construction of quantum states in dimension d that has at least 1 dit of ideal key,
called private dits (pdits), which covers most of the known examples of private bits (pbits) d = 2.
We examine properties of this class of states, focusing mostly on its distance to the set of separable
states SEP, showing that for a fixed dimension of key part dk the distance increases with ds. We
provide explicit examples of PPT states (in d dimensions) which are nearly as far from separable
ones as possible. Precisely, the distance from the set of SEP is 2 − ǫ, where d scales with ǫ as
d ∝ 1/ǫ3, as opposed to d ∝ 2(log(4/ǫ))
2
obtained in [Badzia¸g et al., Phys. Rev. A 90, 012301
(2014)]. We do not use boosting (taking many copies of pdits to boost the distance) as in Badzia¸g
et al. paper.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography allows perfect secrets sharing among honest parties and is, up-to-date, the most successful
and commercial branch among quantum information science. In 2007, quantum cryptography has been used to secure
part of the vote counting in a referendum in the canton of Geneva and in 2010, in collaboration with the University
of Kwazulu-Natal, South Africa, to encrypt a connection in the Durban stadium during the football World Cup in
2010. But, what is the source of its power? Briefly speaking, the fundamental property which guarantees security of
the quantum cryptography is that if one does not know the state of a qubit, then with a high probability one disturbs
the state while trying to get to know it.
This implies there is a clear relation between quantum security and correlations in the form of quantum entangle-
ment. If such correlations are maximal, between two qubits, they can be changed via measurement into one bit of a
secret key (also called ’classical’ key). First protocols of quantum key distribution were based only on pure entangled
states [1–3] as well as, security proof [4], which have led to natural expectations that pure entangled quantum states
are the only source of quantum security [5, 6]. However, we know that entanglement can be manifested not only in
a pure form, but also in a mixed one. What is more, there are some mixed entangled quantum states from which
no pure entangled states can be obtained using local operations and classical communication (LOCC), called bound
entangled states [7, 8]. It was hoped that bound states are useless for quantum cryptography - no key would be
distillable from the classical distribution. But, the quite surprising at that time, discovery of private bound entangled
states, has tempered those hopes and demonstrated a clear distinction between secrecy and bound entanglement [9].
The key ingredient in showing that distinction was the notion of private states (introduced in [9]), quantum states
that contain directly accessible, ideally secure classical key, and private bits, p-bit - or more generally a private dit, pdit
- which is a delocalized maximally entangled state that still retains some entanglement monogamy result. A quantum
p-dit is composed from a d ⊗ d AB part called ”key”, and A′B′ called ”shield”, shared between Alice (subsystems
AA′) and Bob (subsystems BB′) in such a way that the local von Neumann measurements on the key part in a
particular basis will make its results completely statistically uncorrelated from the results of any measurement of an
eavesdropper Eve on her subsystem E, which is a part of the purification |Ψ〉ABA′B′E of the p-dit state ρABA′B′ .
Pdits (especially pbits), have been studied extensively for some time [10–15].
Quite recently, an important discovery has been made in studies between security and correlations. In [16], a clean
classical analogue of bound entanglement and private bound entanglement has been provided, where the authors have
constructed private bound entangled states based on unambiguous classical probability distribution to a quantum
state that is not based on a ”standard” key/shield scheme, opening a new direction in studies of private states.
Our paper is organized in the following way. In Sec. II we present a general construction of the new class of pdits
and show that for specific choices of parameters we can reduce this new class to the cases previously known in the
literature. In Sec. III we investigate properties of the new set of pdits. Namely we calculate the trace distance of
arbitrary pdits from the new class from the pdit in maximally entangled form (Lemma 2). We also show that for
the specific subclass this distance scales inversely with the dimension of the shield part ds (Lemma 3). At the end
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2of this section, we give the lower bound for the trace distance from the set of separable states SEP and our subclass
(Lemma 5) which gives better estimation than the previous one [17]. What is the most important, we are able to
show that for particular subclass of pdits, we do not need to take many copies of pdits to boost the distance from the
set of separable set SEP (like in [17]) using our construction. We also show that our family of states approximate
the set of separable states obtaining the distance equal to 2 − ǫ and improving the scaling of ǫ with the distance.
Additionally, we present two appendices in which we describe a special method which allows us to prove one of the
crucial statements in our paper, i.e. Lemma 3 (Appendix A). In Appendix B we remind the special construction of
the set of operators which is one of the possible realizations of operators with desired spectra needed in Sec. III.
II. GENERAL CONSTRUCTION OF PDITS
As we have mentioned in the Introduction we want to construct a four partite state ρABA′B′ (pdit) which has
PPT property and it is close to pdits in the so called maximally entangled form (see Section III). Let us consider the
following state:
ρABA′B′ =
d∑
l=0
ωl ∈ B (Hdk ⊗Hdk ⊗Hds ⊗Hds) , (1)
where B(H) is the algebra of all bounded linear operators on Hilbert space H, d = 12dk(dk − 1) and by dk we denote
the dimension of the key part acting on AB and by ds the dimension of the shield part acting on A
′B′. Now we
describe each of the components from Eq. (1). First of all, we define the term ω0 as:
ω0 =
dk−1∑
i,j=0
|i〉〈j| ⊗ |i〉〈j| ⊗ a(0,0)ij , (2)
where every a
(0,0)
ij ∈ B (Hds ⊗Hds). From now, every matrix of the form (2) we will call matrix in the maximally
entangled form. The rest of elements ωl, for 1 ≤ l ≤ 12dk(dk − 1) from Eq. (1) are given by the following formula
ωl = |i〉〈i| ⊗ |j〉〈j| ⊗ a(i,j)00 + |i〉〈j| ⊗ |j〉〈i| ⊗ a(i,j)01 +
+ |j〉〈i| ⊗ |i〉〈j| ⊗ a(i,j)10 + |j〉〈j| ⊗ |i〉〈i| ⊗ a(i,j)11 ,
(3)
where i, j = 1, . . . , dk − 1 and i < j. In the above we also implicitly assume bijection function between indices l and
i, j.
Let us introduce the following notation, namely:
A(i,j) =
(
a
(i,j)
00 a
(i,j)
01
a
(i,j)
10 a
(i,j)
11
)
, (4)
where i, j = 0, . . . , dk − 1 for i < j. Separately, for the term A(0,0), we have
A(0,0) =

a
(0,0)
00 · · · a(0,0)0,dk−1
...
. . .
...
a
(0,0)
dk−1,0 · · · a
(0,0)
dk−1,dk−1
 . (5)
Then, there is an explicit connection between positivity of the state ρABA′B′ and each submatrix A
(i,j) and positivity
of ρ
TA′ TB′
ABA′B′ and each block A
(i,j) after partial transposition on the system B′. This can be summarized as follows
Observation 1. We have the following relations between positivity of the state ρABA′B′ before and after partial
transposition and positivity properties of every block A(i,j):
1. Positivity of the state ρABA′B′
ρABA′B′ ≥ 0⇔ A(i,j) ≥ 0, (6)
32. Positivity of the state ρABA′B′ with respect to partial transposition in the cut AB : A
′B′
(1A ⊗ TB ⊗1A′ ⊗ TB′) ρABA′B′ ≥ 0⇔ A˜(i,j) ≥ 0, (7)
where A˜(i,j) is given by
A˜(i,j) =
(
a˜
(i,j)
00 a˜
(0,0)
ij
a˜
(0,0)
ji a˜
(i,j)
11
)
, i, j = 0, . . . , dk − 1 with i < j,
and
A˜
(0,0)
ij =

a˜
(0,0)
ij , i = j
a˜
(i,j)
01 , i < j
a˜
(i,j)
10 , i > j
, i, j = 0, . . . , dk − 1.
In the above, we have a˜
(i,j)
00 = (1B ⊗ TB′) a(i,j)00 and so on.
Proof. The proof of above statement is based on straightforward observation. Namely one can notice that every
component of the state from equation (1) is defined on different subspaces which are orthogonal to each other, thus
every block can be treated separately - we can consider positivity and PPT conditions on each of the component
independently. This fact implies all claimed properties of states ρABA′B′ from (1).
At the end of this section we show for which choices of matrices ω0 and ωl we can reduce our general construction,
given by formulas (1), (2) and (3), to the previously known cases. First let us write general matrix expressions for
state ρABA′B′ from the formula (1) when the dimension of the key part is dk = 2, 3. Namely for dk = 2 we have
ρABA′B′ = ω0 + ω1, (8)
where
ω0 =

a
(0,0)
00 · · a(0,0)01
· · · ·
· · · ·
a
(0,0)
10 · · a(0,0)11
 , ω1 =

· · · ·
· a(0,1)00 a(0,1)01 ·
· a(0,1)10 a(0,1)11 ·
· · · ·
 (9)
For dk = 3 state ρABA′B′ is represented as
ρABA′B′ = ω0 + ω1 + ω2 + ω3 ∈ B
(
C
3 ⊗ C3 ⊗ Cds ⊗ Cds) , (10)
where
4ρ0 =

a
(0,0)
00 · · · a(0,0)01 · · · a(0,0)02
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
a
(0,0)
10 · · · a(0,0)11 · · · a(0,0)12
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
a
(0,0)
20 · · · a(0,0)21 · · · a(0,0)22

, ρ1 =

· · · · · · · · ·
· a(0,1)00 · a(0,1)01 · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· a(0,1)10 · a(0,1)11 · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·

, ρ2 =

· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · a(0,2)00 · · · a(0,2)01 · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · a(0,2)10 · · · a(0,2)11 · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·

,
ρ3 =

· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · a(1,2)00 · a(1,2)01 ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · a(1,2)10 · a(1,2)11 ·
· · · · · · · · ·

.
(11)
Form the above examples we see that operators ωk are supported on orthogonal subspaces. Now, we are ready to
present five examples of private states which belong to our class:
1. Suppose that γV ∈ B (C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cds ⊗ Cds) such that
γV =
1
2

1/d2s · · V /d2s
· · · ·
· · · ·
V /d2s · · 1/d2s
 , (12)
where V =
∑ds−1
i=0 |ij〉〈ji| is known as the swap operator, 1 is the identity matrix of dimension d2s × d2s and by
dots we denote matrices of dimension d2s × d2s filled with zeros [18].
2. Suppose that ρflower ∈ B
(
C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cds ⊗ Cds) such that
ρflower =
1
2

σ · · UT/ds
· · · ·
· · · ·
U∗/ds · · σ
 , (13)
where σ = (1/ds)
∑ds−1
i=0 |ii〉〈ii| is the classical maximally correlated state and U is an embedding of unitary
transformation W =
∑ds−1
i,j=0 wij |i〉〈j| in the form U =
∑ds−1
i,j=0 wij |ii〉〈jj|. The state (13) is known as the flower
state [13].
3. Suppose that ρ ∈ B (C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Clds ⊗ Clds) such that
ρABA′B′ =
1
2

p(τ0 + τ1) · · p(τ1 − τ0)
· (1− 2p)τ0 · ·
· · (1− 2p)τ0 ·
p(τ1 − τ0) · · p(τ0 + τ1)
 . (14)
In the above τ0 = ρ
⊗l
s , τ1 = [(ρa + ρs)/2]
⊗l, l is a positive integer number, B(Cds) ∋ ρs = 2d2
s
+ds
Psym,
B(Cds) ∋ ρa = 2d2
s
−ds Pas, where Psym,Pas are respectively symmetric and antisymmetric projectors for bipartite
case. It has been shown that a class of states (14) is bound entangled with a private key KD > 0 [13].
54. Finally, let us take ρABA′B′ ∈ B
(
C2 ⊗ C2 ⊗ Cds ⊗ Cds) in the most general form of pbit, the so-called X−form
of pbit [13]:
ρABA′B′ =
1
2

√
XX† · · X
· · · ·
· · · ·
X† · ·
√
X†X
 , (15)
where X is an arbitrary operator with ||X ||1 = 1 and dots represent zero matrices.
5. For a larger dimension of the key part, for example dk = 3, we can take ρABA′B′ ∈ B
(
C3 ⊗ C3 ⊗ Cds ⊗ Cds) in
the following way
ρABA′B′ =
1
3

√
XX† · · · X · · · XY
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
X† · · ·
√
X†X · · · Y
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
(XY )† · · · Y † · · ·
√
Y †Y

, (16)
where matrices X,Y satisfy ||X ||1 = ||Y ||1 = 1 and X =WY † for an arbitrary unitary transformation W [18].
From the above examples we can easily figure out explicit form of the operators ωk in every case.
III. PROPERTIES
In this section we formulate theorem, which determines the distance in the trace norm between our set of states and
the set of pdits in the maximally entangled form. Next, we show (Lemma 3) that this distance depends on the shield
dimension ds for a special but quite general subclass of pdits. Namely, we show that this distance scales inversely
with the shield dimension ds. At the end we also calculate the trace distance from the set of separable states using
a special representation of the pdit (Lemma 5). In this and next sections, without loss of generality, we assume the
state ρABA′B′ to be
ρABA′B′ = pγ0 +
q
d
d∑
i=1
γi, (17)
where p+ q = 1, d = 12dk(dk − 1) and
γ0 =
1
Trω0
ω0, γi =
1
Trωi
ωi, (18)
so such a state indeed belongs to the class defined in Sec. II, and state γ0 we will call pdit in the maximally entangled
form. Now, we are ready to formulate the main results of this section.
Lemma 2. Let us assume that we are given ρABA′B′ as in Eq. (1) and the pdit γ0 in its maximally entangled form,
then the following statement holds:
||ρABA′B′ − γ0||1 = 2q. (19)
Proof. The proof is based on straightforward calculations. Let us compute the desired trace distance between ρABA′B′
and γ0:
||ρABA′B′ − γ0||1 =
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣pγ0 + qd
d∑
i=1
γi − γ0
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
=
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ qd
d∑
i=1
γi − qγ0
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
=
q
d
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
d∑
i=1
γi − dγ0
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
1
. (20)
6Now, using the definition of trace norm we rewrite the last term from the above calculations in a more explicit way
||ρABA′B′ − γ0||1 = q
d
Tr
( d∑
i=1
γi − dγ0
)(
d∑
i=1
γi − dγ0
)†1/2 , (21)
because we deal with hermitian matrices we have
||ρABA′B′ − γ0||1 = q
d
Tr
( d∑
i=1
γi + dγ0
)21/2 , (22)
and finally
||ρABA′B′ − γ0||1 = q
d
Tr
[
d∑
i=1
γi + dγ0
]
= 2q. (23)
We obtain the statement of our theorem, so the proof is finished.
Next, we formulate and prove the next lemma, which states that the distance between our class of states given in
Sec. II and pdit in its maximally entangled form decreases with the dimension of the shield part ds. We do it for a
specific choice of operators ω0, ωk given by Eqs (2), (3), which gives a wide class of pdits. Let us choose all matrices
a
(0,0)
ij = a, where 0 ≤ i, j ≤ dk in such a way that
spec(a) =
{
1
d2s
, . . . ,
1
d2s
}
, (24)
and all matrices a
(i,j)
mn = b, where 0 ≤ m,n ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ i, j ≤ 12dk(dk − 1) with i < j as:
spec(b) =
{
1
ds
, . . . ,
1
ds
}
. (25)
We also assume that operators which have such spectra are invariant under partial transposition with respect to the
system B′. At this point we refer the reader to Appendix B in which we show the explicit form of operators satisfying
all requirements. Using the above definitions we are ready to show the following
Lemma 3. Let us consider the class of states given by
ρABA′B′ = pγ0 +
q
d
d∑
i=1
γi, (26)
where q = 1− p, d = 12dk(dk − 1) and states γ0, γi are given by Eqs (2), (3), together with (24), (25). Then the trace
distance from the set of private dits in maximally entangled form is equal to
1
2
||ρABA′B′ − γ0||1 = 1
1 + dsdk−1
, (27)
where ds is the dimension of the shield part and dk - the dimension of the key part.
Proof. We need to show that in our scheme the parameter q which is equal to the trace distance between states
ρABA′B′ and pdits γ0 in their maximally entangled form is equal to 1/(1 +
ds
dk−1), where ds, dk are dimensions of
the shield and the key part respectively. To prove this property we use the construction described in details in
Appendix A. Because we have assumed that our matrices a and b are invariant under partial transposition with
respect to the system B′ we can directly use equality from Eq. (A8) putting instead of a˜, a matrix a and instead of
b˜, a matrix b. Then we have
q
dk − 1λ (b)− pλ (a) = 0, (28)
where by λ(a), λ(b) we denote nonzero eigenvalues of operators a and b respectively. Now using formulas (24) and (25)
we get
q
dk − 1
1
ds
− p 1
d2s
= 0. (29)
Solving the above equality with p = 1− q we obtain the statement of our Lemma. This finishes the proof.
7Before we formulate next result we introduce the following notation
Notation 4. Suppose that we are given a quantum state ρ and the set of separable states SEP, then by dist(ρ,SEP)
we understand the following quantity
dist(ρ,SEP) = min
σ∈SEP
||ρ− σ||1, (30)
which is of course double minimal trace distance. In further part of this manuscript whenever we talk about distance
we mean the above notation.
Now we are ready to calculate the lower bound on distance between the set of separable states denoted by SEP
and our subclass of pdits given in the argumentation before Lemma 3.
Lemma 5. The distance between set of separable states SEP and class of states of the form
ρABA′B′ = pγ0 +
q
d
d∑
i=1
γi, (31)
where q = 1− p and d = 12dk(dk − 1) is bounded form below:
dist(ρABA′B′ ,SEP) ≥ 2− 2
dk
− 2
1 + dsdk−1
, (32)
where ds denotes the dimension of the shield part and the dk dimension of the key part.
Proof. In our proof we use the fact that distance between an arbitrary private state γ¯ and the set of separable states
SEP is bounded from below [17] by:
dist(γ¯,SEP) ≥ 2− 2
dk
, (33)
where dk is dimension of key part. Because the above bound holds for an arbitrary private state, it holds also for a
pdit in its maximally entangled form γ0. Now let us take the closest separable state ω to ρABA′B′ given by Eq. (31).
Using the triangle inequality we can write
||ρABA′B′ − ω||1 + ||ρABA′B′ − γ0||1 ≥ ||ω − γ0||1 ≥ dist(γ0,SEP) ≥ 2− 2
dk
, (34)
but from Lemma 3 we know, that ||ρABA′B′ − γ0||1 = 21+ ds
dk−1
, so
||ρABA′B′ − ω||1 + 2
1 + dsdk−1
≥ 2− 2
dk
. (35)
The above inequality directly implies that
dist(ρABA′B′ ,SEP) ≥ 2− 2
dk
− 2
1 + dsdk−1
. (36)
Let us notice that for our special case dk = 2, when Alice and Bob share qubit states, the bound obviously improves
with dimension of the shield part and has minimum for ds = 2, i.e. when Alice and Bob share four-qubit state.
Let us recall that the state from Lemma 3 can be considered as a PPT state acting on Cd ⊗ Cd, where d = dsdk.
We can formulate the following, recovering the result from [17] and [19]
Theorem 6. For an arbitrary ǫ > 0 there exists a PPT state ρ acting on the Hilbert space Cd ⊗Cd with d ≤ cǫ3 such
that:
dist(ρ,SEP) ≥ 2− ǫ, (37)
where c is constant. The sate is given by (26).
The proof is straightforward and based on simple calculations, so it is not reported here. We have found analytically
that constant c < 64. This result considerably improves the bound obtained in [17].
8IV. SUMMARY
In this paper, we present the construction of the set of pdits, which contains many known examples of private
states from the literature (Section II). We also present the result specifying the trace distance between our set of
pdits and the pdit in the maximally entangled form. Next, we connect this result with a dimension of the shield part
ds, and we prove that this distance is inversely proportional to ds at least for a particular subclass of pdits. We also
calculate the trace distance from the set of separable states SEP and show that for a fixed dimension of key part dk
this distance decreases with ds. The most interesting property of our new class of states, which differs it from the
known results is that we do not need many copies of them (see [17]) to boost distance from the set of separable states
SEP (Section III). We also provide explicit calculations of a family of states such that we recover the 2 − ǫ distance
from SEP [19], [17] in a natural and basic way. Finally, we show that the scaling of ǫ with the distance is d ∝ 1/ǫ3,
and it is considerably better than d ∝ 2(log(4/ǫ))2 from [17] .
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Appendix A: Construction of special pdits subclass
In this section we describe the method which we have used to obtain explicit positivity conditions in the proof of
the Lemma 3 for an arbitrary dimension of the key part dk. Our argumentation is made for the specific subclass of
states given at the begin of Section II. Suppose that above mentioned subclass is in the following form
ρABA′B′ = pγ0 +
q
d
d∑
i=1
γi ∈ B (Hdk ⊗Hdk ⊗Hds ⊗Hds) , (A1)
where d = 12dk(dk − 1) and matrices γ0, γi are defined on orthogonal subspaces in the same similar way as in (2), (3).
Of course to satisfy ρABA′B′ ≥ 0 we need γ0 ≥ 0 and γi ≥ 0. In our construction operator γ0 corresponds with (2),
but all a
(0,0)
ij = a together with ||a||1 = 1. Similarly we proceed for the matrices γi by putting all submatrices a(i,j)mn
equal to b with ||b||1 = 1. Thanks to this we have explicit connection between states γ0, γi and ω0, ωi from (2), (3) by
the following formulas
γ0 =
1
dk
ω0, γi =
1
2
ωi, where d =
1
2
dk(dk − 1). (A2)
It is easy to see that to ensure PPT property respect to partial transposition on BB′ it is enough to satisfy PPT condi-
tion for every component of (A1) separately after partial transposition. Thanks to this and property of orthogonality
we can write
(1A ⊗ TB ⊗1A′ ⊗ TB′) ρABA′B′ ≥ 0⇔ PTdk =

pa˜ qdk−1 b˜ · · ·
q
dk−1 b˜
q
dk−1 b˜ pa˜ · · ·
q
dk−1 b˜
...
. . .
...
q
dk−1 b˜ · · · pb˜
q
dk−1 a˜
 ≥ 0, (A3)
and
(1A ⊗ TB ⊗1A′ ⊗ TB′) ρABA′B′ ≥ 0⇔ PT =
(
q
dk−1 b˜ pa˜
pa˜ qdk−1 b˜
)
≥ 0, (A4)
9where a˜, b˜ are operators a, b after partial transposition respect to subsystem B′, and second condition is taken dk
times.
In general, still it is hard to say are constraints (A3) and (A4) satisfied, but there is nice mathematical trick which
allows us to rewrite above condition in more operative way. Namely matrices PTdk and PT can be written as
PTdk = 1dk ⊗ pa˜− 1dk ⊗
q
dk − 1 b˜+ Idk ⊗
q
dk − 1 b˜ ≥ 0,
PT = 12 ⊗ q
dk − 1 b˜ − 12 ⊗ pa˜+ I2 ⊗ pa˜ ≥ 0,
(A5)
where 1dk ,12 are identity matrices of dimensions dk and 2 respectively, Idk and I2 with all entries equal to 1 of
dimensions dk and 2 respectively. To say that PTdk and PT are positive is enough to say that they have all eigenvalues
λ greater or equal to zero, so we can write:
λ (PTdk) = λ (1dk ⊗ pa˜)− λ
(
1dk ⊗
q
dk − 1 b˜
)
+ λ
(
Idk ⊗
q
dk − 1 b˜
)
≥ 0,
λ (PT) = λ
(
12 ⊗ q
dk − 1 b˜
)
− λ (12 ⊗ pa˜) + λ (I2 ⊗ pa˜) ≥ 0.
(A6)
Because spec (Idk) = {0, . . . , 0, dk}, where 0 is taken dk − 1 times we have the following set of constraints
pλ (a˜) + qλ(˜b) ≥ 0,
pλ (a˜)− q
dk − 1λ(˜b) ≥ 0,
q
dk − 1λ(˜b) + pλ (a˜) ≥ 0,
q
dk − 1λ(˜b)− pλ (a˜) ≥ 0.
(A7)
Form the above we see that only nontrivial conditions are given by the second and fourth inequality, which are reduced
(together) to equality
q
dk − 1λ(˜b)− pλ (a˜) = 0. (A8)
We see that to ensure PPT property, it is enough to satisfy only one constrain, which depends only on eigenvalues of
submatrices of γ0 and γi.
Appendix B: Construction of the operators with specific constraints on spectra
In the Section II we use a class of operators with the specific properties such that invariance respect to partial
transposition on B′ system and particular spectra. Now, we present one of the possible realization of such operators.
Namely, let us take (see [17])
X =
1
ds
√
ds
ds∑
i,j=1
uij |ij〉〈ji|, Y =
√
dsX
T
B′ =
1
ds
ds∑
i,j=1
uij |ii〉〈jj|, (B1)
where uij are matrix elements of some unitary matrix U ∈ M(ds × ds,C) with |uij | = 1√ds . It is easy to see that
(1B ⊗ TB′)X = X and (1B ⊗ TB′)Y = Y . Moreover, we can prove the following
Fact 7. Matrices
√
XX† and
√
Y Y †, where X,Y are given by the formula (B1) satisfy:
spec
(√
XX†
)
=
{
1
d2s
, . . . ,
1
d2s
}
, spec
(√
Y Y †
)
=
{
1
ds
, . . . ,
1
ds
, 0, . . . , 0
}
, (B2)
where ds denotes dimension of the shield part, and for every matrix we have ds eigenvalues. Moreover, multiplicity
of 1/d2s is equal to d
2
s, multiplicity of 1/ds is equal to ds and finally, multiplicity of zeros is equal to ds(ds − 1).
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Proof. The proof is based on the following observation
XX† = X†X =
1
d4s
, Y Y † = Y †Y =
1
d2s
. (B3)
Let us redefine X and Y introducing X˜ = d2sX and Y˜ = ds
√
dsY . We have thatX˜X˜
† = X˜†X˜ = 1 and similarly for
Y˜ . Thanks to this we see that matrices X˜, Y˜ are unitary, so their eigenvalues are eiϕi , for i = 1, . . . , ds. Now it is
easy to deduce that
spec (X) =
{
1
d2s
eiϕ1 , . . . ,
1
d2s
eiϕds
}
, spec (Y ) =
{
1
ds
eiϕ1 , . . . ,
1
ds
eiϕds
}
, (B4)
and
spec
(
XX†
)
=
{
1
d4s
, . . . ,
1
d4s
}
, spec
(
Y Y †
)
=
{
1
d2s
, . . . ,
1
d2s
}
. (B5)
In equations (B4) and (B5) for simplicity we have omitted zeros in the spectra of spec(Y ) and spec(Y Y †). Moreover,
they do not give us any nontrivial condition for positivity (see Section A). Finally for
√
XX†,
√
Y Y † we simply have
to take square roots from every eigenvalue from above spectra to obtain the desired result.
Now, in Lemma 3 we can directly substitute
√
XX† instead of a(0,0)kl , where 0 ≤ k, l ≤ dk − 1 and
√
Y Y † instead of
a
(i,j)
mn , where 0 ≤ m,n ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ i, j ≤ dk − 1 for i < j we obtain the specific example of pdit from our class.
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